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Abstract 
The relationship between bank competition and financial stability has been thoroughly debated 
over the last decades. The importance of a stable banking system for financial stability makes 
this a topic of interest for both economists and regulators.  
Using accounting data for Norwegian banks over the last 20 years, we assess the relationship 
between the rate of non-performing loans and different measures of competition. We find a 
non-linear relationship between market concentration and loan risk. For low levels of 
concentration, increased concentration reduces non-performing loan rates. Past a certain level 
of concentration, this relationship is reversed. Our findings indicate that the Norwegian banking 
market today is close to this optimal level, suggesting that a continued increasing trend in 
concentration will contribute to higher non-performing loan rates. 
Using the interest rate margin and the H-statistic as competitive measures, we find a linear 
positive relationship between competition and non-performing loan rates. Provided that these 
measures capture competitive behavior, this implies that competition increases loan risk.  
Our findings are consistent with relevant theoretical models and earlier empirical research, and 
underline how results depend on the choice of competition measure. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and purpose 
Banks serve an important role in the economy. They are intermediaries of transactions, offer 
credit to borrowers and they accept and manage deposits for the public. Financial crises often 
spread out to other industries in the economy via the banking system. This can happen due to 
reduced credit availability, disturbed interbank lending or frozen payments (Berger, Klapper, 
& Turk-Ariss, 2008). Ensuring a stable banking system is therefore crucial for financial 
stability. However, financial crises over the last decades have exposed the vulnerability of the 
banking system to excessive risk taking by individual banks.  
For several decades, economic literature has investigated a possible link between the degree of 
competition in the banking market and the incentives for banks to take risk. The main 
motivation is that excessive competition between banks has been blamed for past financial 
crises. However, competition in banking markets is generally thought to be positive for 
consumers, ensuring greater variety in financial products and wider access to credit. Empirical 
studies have also found competition in banking markets to be an important factor for economic 
growth (Bikker, Shaffer, & Spierdijk, 2012).  
Allen and Gale (2003) argue that while costs of financial instability are large and apparent, 
efficiency gains of competition are harder to measure and are born continuously. As a result, 
the common perception that increased competition may hurt financial stability can lead 
policymakers to favor concentration over competition in banking markets.  
Differing views on the effects of competition in banking markets has created the foundation for 
an ongoing debate about whether competition contributes positively or negatively to financial 
stability. The literature has divided itself into two main paradigms: Competition-fragility and 
competition-stability. The competition-fragility paradigm claims that competition creates 
incentives for banks to take more risk, while the competition-stability paradigm argues the 
opposite: competitive behavior secures financial stability. Both views are well founded in 
microeconomic theories, and could all be valid in different market situations. Recent literature 
has therefore attempted to reconcile the seemingly conflicting theories. Several empirical 
studies have also attempted to investigate this relationship, although yielding equally divergent 
results.  
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In Norway, banking competition has recently attracted considerable attention in the public 
debate. The main focus of the debate has been on whether the competitive level is sufficient, or 
if Norwegian banks are allowed to charge excessive interest rate margins. However, less focus 
has been directed towards the potential negative consequences of increased competition on 
financial stability. 
This master thesis aims to investigate how risk-taking of Norwegian banks is affected by 
changes in competition. To analyze this relationship, we focus on the risk-exposure of banks’ 
loan portfolios. We use a panel of quarterly accounting data for all Norwegian banks over the 
last two decades. Our analysis is similar to comparable studies (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 
2008; Jiménez, Lopez, & Saurina, 2013), using a collection of competition measures to explain 
the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolios. To the authors’ knowledge, this topic has not previously 
been studied for the Norwegian banking market. 
1.2 Research question 
This thesis aims to investigate the following research question: 
How does the competitiveness of the Norwegian banking market impact the risk exposure of the 
banks’ loan portfolios?  
We attempt to address this question by regressing various competitive measures on the banks’ 
rate of non-performing loans.   
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1.3 Outline 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In section 2 we review relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature. This provides a context for understanding how competition may impact 
banks’ risk-taking, and how this has been studied in the past. Section 3 presents the general 
econometric model used for our analysis. This general model is later estimated by using 
different measures of competition. In section 4 we present our data and explain how variables 
included in our model are defined and calculated. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics. This 
allows us to study important developments in the Norwegian banking market during our sample 
period. Section 6 discusses our estimation method, while section 7 presents the results from 
the analysis. Finally, section 8 concludes.  
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2. Literature review 
The relationship between competition and stability in the banking system has been subject to a 
great amount of research in both theoretical and empirical literature. Since banks are exposed 
to many sources of risk, the literature offers several points of view on how competition may 
affect banks’ risk exposure. Some of these sources of risk are difficult for the bank to control, 
such as the risk of a bank run. Other sources of risk are more closely related to risk preference, 
such as the exposure of the banks’ loan portfolios. We concentrate on literature that describe 
how competition affects the risk-taking decisions of banks. We also describe some of the 
methods used to investigate the relationship between competition and bank risk in empirical 
studies. Choosing appropriate measures of risk and competition are especially important 
decisions in this context.  
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
There is no clear consensus in the theoretical literature on exactly how competition in the 
banking markets affect banks’ exposure to risk. With respect to the relationship between 
competition and stability, the theoretical literature is divided between two different paradigms: 
competition-fragility and competition-stability.   
2.1.1 Competition-fragility 
The competition-fragility paradigm has a strong standing within banking literature, and has 
been supported over time both theoretically and empirically. This is the view that competition 
hurts financial stability by increasing banks’ risk exposure. 
Keeley (1990) started this strand of literature by introducing the “franchise value” hypothesis. 
He claimed that the sharp increase in bank failures during the 1980s could be attributed to 
financial deregulation in the preceding decades. According to Keeley, removal of regulatory 
barriers intensified the competition between banking organizations, which had a negative effect 
on the banks’ profit margins. This, in turn, decreased the franchise value of the banks, defined 
as the market value beyond the banks’ book values. Keeley found this reduction in franchise 
value to have caused an increase in banks’ risk taking.  
Hellmann, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) contributed to the franchise value hypothesis by stating 
that competition in the deposit market increases the moral hazard incentives of banks. 
According to the authors, the franchise value can only be captured if the bank remains in 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
8
business and therefore represents the opportunity cost for the bank of going bankrupt. They 
argue that increased competition for deposits diminishes the profitability of banks and reduces 
franchise values. As a result, competition gives banks an incentive to increase their risk 
exposure and gamble with the depositors’ money. In another paper, Matutes and Vives (2000) 
also argue that high levels of competition in the deposit market leads to excessive risk taking 
by banks. 
Increased competition between banks may also have a negative effect on the credit-worthiness 
of the banks’ loan applicants. This is due to an adverse selection problem in the loans market 
(Broecker, 1990; Shaffer, 1990). In a market with many banks, a rejected loan applicant is able 
to re-apply for a loan at competing banks. If the banks’ credit screenings are independent of 
each other and the judgment errors being made differ across banks, the amount of loan 
applicants being approved by at least one bank will increase with the number of banks 
(Broecker, 1990). This implies that the average creditworthiness of the pool of applicants is a 
decreasing function of the number of banks.  
Allen and Gale (2000) discuss the effects of increased competition on the risk of contagion in 
the financial system. In the case of a small aggregate shock in demand for liquidity, perfect 
competition in the interbank market can lead to systemic risk. When each bank is small 
compared to the whole market, it will act as a price taker and have no incentive to provide 
liquidity to another troubled bank, thereby causing contagion to spread. Under these 
assumptions, it may therefore be optimal with an imperfectly competitive interbank market.  
2.1.2 Competition - stability 
The competition-stability paradigm supports the view that less competition leads to a more 
stable banking system. Fundamental for this view is the article from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
studying mechanisms in the loan market that result in credit rationing. In the loan market one 
would expect that a shortage of available capital would simply raise the lending rate, and the 
market would return to equilibrium. However, market equilibrium is not necessarily the optimal 
solution for banks if interest rates are too high. This is caused by the following market 
mechanisms: 
The adverse selection aspect is a result of imperfect information in the loan market. A 
borrowers’ probability of repaying their loans varies between individuals, and higher rates 
attract riskier borrowers; they are willing to borrow at the high rate because the probability of 
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repaying the loan is lower. A higher rate and a subsequent higher margin for the bank is not 
necessarily profitable since this also attracts more risk.  
The moral hazard aspect relates to the behavior of the borrowers. When already existing 
customers face higher interest rates, they will seek more risky projects. This is caused by the 
payoff profile. If the project goes bankrupt, the lending bank will cover the losses, while an 
upside for the project will pay out all surpluses to the borrower. 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) draw on these market mechanisms in their theory about competition 
and market risk. They criticize the proponents of the franchise value perspective for assuming 
exogenous distribution of return on the bank’s investments. Investments risk and return may in 
fact be endogenous and depend on the amount of competition in the market. This makes 
competition an important determinant of risk in both the loan and deposit market.  
By assuming that increased competition lowers interest rates, Boyd and De Nicolo (BDN) 
establish a relationship between competition and risk called the risk shifting-effect. This is the 
argument that while higher interest rates increase the franchise value of the banks, the franchise 
values of the borrowers’ projects decrease. Low levels of banking competition therefore 
increase the riskiness of the borrowers. They argue that this is in essence a principal-agent 
relationship that exists in both the loan and deposit market. In the deposit market, the bank will 
be the one taking less risk with depositors’ money if the deposit interest rates are low. When 
margins are higher, banks take less risk. Evidently, competition in the deposit and loan markets 
has opposite effects on bank risk. The authors conclude that a bank’s risk profile will be 
unaffected by changes in competition when the banks compete in both markets.  
The “too big to fail”-hypothesis (Mishkin, 1999) is another argument that competition may 
have positive effects on financial stability. Due to implicit guarantees by the government, banks 
above a certain size believe that they will always be saved through public bailouts. This is 
because the social cost of failure succeeds the private cost when the banks are large enough to 
have systemic importance. This stimulates these banks will be more risk seeking, knowing that 
negative consequences will be covered by the government. In a more fragmented banking 
market, the problem of excessive risk taking due to banks being “too big to fail” will be reduced.   
2.1.3 Reconciling literature 
The competition-stability view promotes competition between banks in order to achieve a stable 
banking system. The competition-fragility view promotes the opposite. While these theoretical 
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views seem to contradict, the two paradigms are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Considering the many mechanisms at work, the relationship between competition and stability 
could be more complex than a simple positive or negative trade-off.  
Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008) point out that the lack of consensus in the literature may 
be explained by the need to distinguish between loan portfolio risk and overall bank risk. The 
competition-fragility view tends to focus on the positive effects of market power on the 
incentives for banks to reduce their overall risk of bankruptcy. On the other hand, literature 
within the competition-stability view puts emphasis on the negative effects of market power on 
loan portfolio risk. Even if market power in the loan market does in fact increase loan portfolio 
risk, higher interest rates should also contribute to increased franchise values. In order to protect 
their gain in franchise value, banks may offset the higher loan risk by mitigating other sources 
of risk, thereby reducing overall bank risk (Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2008).  
Martinez-Miera & Repullo (MMR, 2010) build on the model by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). 
They also analyze risk of failure for banks investing in entrepreneurial loans when the 
probability of the loans defaulting is endogenous and depends on the competition. The 
important extension in the MMR-model is that it allows for imperfectly correlated loan defaults, 
meaning that loans do not necessarily default at the same time. The risk of bank default does 
not necessarily increase with higher interest rates, because performing loans still make 
payments, now with an even higher margin. This margin effect opposes the risk-shifting effect 
from the BDN-model by increasing the buffer to cover loan losses when interest rates rises. The 
net effect of interest rate changes on risk is ambiguous. MMR go on to evaluate these effects at 
different levels of competition, finding a nonlinear U-shaped relationship, reconciling simple 
linear effects as suggested by previous theories. They find that the margin effect almost always 
dominates the risk-shifting effect, making increased competition lead to higher risk of bank 
failure. The exception is in very collusive markets, where the risk-shifting effect dominates; 
increased competition decreases risk of bank failure.  
These explanations suggest that all theories could represent valid mechanisms responding to 
banking competition.  Which mechanisms are dominant and which measures of competition 
and risk that best captures this relationship, is an issue relevant for empirical analysis.  
2.2 Empirical literature 
Several empirical studies have investigated the relationship between the competitive level in 
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banking markets and banks’ risk taking. As in the theoretical literature, the empirical literature 
is inconclusive and the results vary with the different measures of competition and risk. The 
sample and time period analyzed is also an important determinant of the empirical findings 
(Carletti, 2010). 
2.2.1 Empirical strategies in the literature 
A distinction between the different empirical studies is the measures used to explain 
competition. In economic theory, competition determines the firms’ ability to charge a mark-
up over the cost price of their output. A measure of the price-cost margin would therefore 
indicate competitiveness. The Lerner index, which equals the difference between the market 
price and marginal cost divided by the output price, is closely related. The challenge with this 
measure is that it requires access to detailed data on banks’ prices and marginal cost. Since this 
information is not easily accessible, competition is commonly estimated using other proxies 
(Bikker & Spierdijk, 2010).  
One such set of proxies is measures of market concentration. Examples are the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), the number of banks, and measures of the market share of the five 
largest banks (C5). The theoretical basis for using such indexes to measure competition is the 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis. This states that market concentration creates 
an environment with collusion and less competitive behavior. According to this hypothesis, 
concentration is therefore a suitable inverse measure of competition.   
Theoretical literature on banking competition and risk generally do not distinguish between 
competition and concentration (Carletti, 2010). However, the assumption that concentration is 
a measure that can capture competitiveness is debated in empirical literature. One counter-
argument to the SCP hypothesis is that market concentration may be a natural consequence of 
efficient firms gaining market shares. This view is proposed by the efficient structure (ES) 
hypothesis, which states that concentration is endogenous and does not necessarily impair 
competition. Various empirical studies find results both in favor of both the SCP and ES. In a 
survey of this literature, Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Haubrich (2004) conclude that 
concentration measures are not reliable as sole indicators of market competition.  
Several other estimation methods have emerged in response to the need for other measures that 
can describe competitive behavior. The new empirical industrial organization approach (NEIO) 
bases competitive measures on microeconomic models, and is more closely related to the price-
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cost margin. Examples of such measures are proposed by Panzar-Rosse (1987), Bresnahan 
(1982) and Boone et al. (2007) (Bikker & Spierdijk, 2010).  
The most widely applied approach to estimate competition in the banking sector is the Panzar 
and Rosse method (P-R). This method measures market power as the extent to which a change 
in a firm’s factor input prices will be reflected in the equilibrium revenues earned by the firm 
(Bikker & Haaf, 2002). The resulting measure is the H-statistic, which is the sum of elasticities 
of revenue with respect to factor prices. The H-statistic has a range of [−∞, 1], where a value 
of 1 will indicate perfect competition, positive values less than one are consistent with 
monopolistic competition and negative value are in line with collusive or monopolistic 
behavior. According to Carletti (2010), the P-R approach has a solid theoretical foundation. 
However, it makes the assumption that the industry is in long-term equilibrium, which in reality 
is rarely the case.  
In terms of measuring stability, variables may either capture individual bank risk or systemic 
risk. One of the most commonly used measures of individual bank risk is the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒). It measures the risk of the loan portfolio of the bank. 
Another individual bank risk parameter is the Z-score, which describes a bank’s proximity to 
bankruptcy. It equals the number of return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) standard deviations that ROA must 
decrease with for the bank to be insolvent. Measures of systemic risk include the degree of 
correlation between banks’ stock returns (Carletti, 2010). 
2.2.2 Empirical findings on banking competition and stability 
Empirical studies investigating the relationship between competition and stability are 
performed either for individual countries or over cross-country samples.  
In a study of the Spanish banking market, Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2013) investigate 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo’s theory of a non-linear relationship between banking competition 
in the loans and deposit markets and risk-taking. Using 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 as the dependent risk variable, 
the authors find support of a non-linear relationship when using market concentration indexes 
in the loans market as competition measures.  However, when using Lerner indexes the results 
for the loans market are more in support of the original franchise value hypothesis.  
Cross country-studies have been performed over the last years due to the new availability of 
comparable data across countries. In a summary of the literature on banking competition and 
stability, Carletti (2010) points out that cross-country studies generally find a positive 
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relationship between competition and stability in the banking sector. These same cross-country 
studies also find a positive correlation between concentration and stability. This could imply 
that the benefits from concentration in terms of stability are not a result of lower competition, 
but through other effects such as diversification.  
In a comprehensive cross-country study using data for 8235 banks in 23 developed nations, 
Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008) test how the empirical relationship between risk and 
competition is affected by using different measures of banking risk and market power. Their 
findings indicate that while banks enjoying higher market power have less overall risk exposure 
(measured by 𝑍– 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒), they also have higher loan portfolio risk (measured by 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒).  
The results thus provide support of both the competition-fragility and competition-stability 
views.  
Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012) perform a cross-country study investigating the relationship 
between competition and financial stability for 10 Latin American countries in the period 2003-
2008. They find a significant non-linear relationship, but unlike other studies the estimated 
coefficients indicate that both high and low competition increase financial stability. Rather than 
explaining individual bank risk measures, this study use a measure of stability derived from 
estimation of a stability stochastic frontier.  
2.2.3 Competitive studies of the Norwegian banking market 
While we have not found studies that investigate the competition-risk relationship specifically 
for the Norwegian banking market, Norway is included in the sample for the cross-country 
study of Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss (2008). In the spring of 2015, the Norwegian 
Competitive Authority (NCA) released a report analyzing the competitive environment in the 
Norwegian home mortgage market. The report was initiated on the basis of growing concern 
that Norwegian banks are using their market power to coordinate interest rate levels. NCA 
gathered detailed data from eleven banks in Norway, and focused on the banks’ interest rate 
margins as an indicator of competitive behavior. Although the report does not reflect on the 
link between competition and the banks’ risk exposure, it concludes that the Norwegian 
mortgage market suffers from insufficient competition (NCA, 2015). 
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3. Econometric model 
In order to investigate the relationship between competition and risk in the banking market, we 
choose to estimate the following general model:  
(1) 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
We use the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡) as the dependent variable, 
measuring the risk exposure of banks’ loan portfolio. This allows us to explain banks’ risk-
taking behavior in the loan market. 
Our model includes four lagged terms of the dependent variable, to account for the persistence 
in non-performing loan rates. This has consequences for our choice of estimator, which will be 
discussed in section 6. 
We will attempt to estimate our model by including different measures of competition. The 
competition measures are chosen on the basis of being both commonly applied in empirical 
literature, and within the limits of our available data. These include concentration measures, 
interest rate margin, and the H-statistic. In section 4, we explain in greater detail how these 
variables are constructed. 
Recent literature has argued that competition may affect the risk-taking of banks through many 
different channels (Boyd & De Nicolò, 2005; Berger, Klapper, & Turk-Ariss, 2008; Martinez-
Miera & Repullo, 2010). As a result, the relationship between competition and risk may be non-
linear. We investigate this by including a squared term of the competition measure.  
Control variables included both macro trends and bank-specific variables, which may affect the 
ratio of non-performing loans. M denotes the number of included control variables. Finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
is the model error term. 
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4. Data and construction of variables 
For the analysis in this thesis, we obtain quarterly data on earnings, costs and balance statements 
of banks operating in Norway starting from the last quarter of 1991, until the end of 2014. The 
data is assembled by Statistics Norway through financial statements and contained in a database 
called ORBOF1, to which all banking corporations operating in Norway are required to report 
on a quarterly basis.  
To allow for risk analysis we have been provided data non-performing loans, a measure 
consisting of loans for which interest and principal payments have not been paid on time.  
All banks operating in Norway are obligated to report financial statements to ORBOF. The 
banks can be classified as either Norwegian-owned, subsidiaries of foreign banks, as well as 
branches of foreign-owned banks. Some exceptions apply to Norwegian-registered branches of 
foreign banks (NUF), which for example are not required to report data on equity ratios.  
Banks with activity outside of Norway are required to report for their legal entity, which 
includes its foreign activities. This concerns DNB, Santander, Nordea and Eika Kredittbank. 
These banks therefore report for two separate entities in each period. In our empirical analysis, 
we make sure to only include one of these entities.   
The data is reported on a non-consolidated level for the parent bank, excluding activity in 
subsidiaries. An important issue regarding non-consolidated data is that over the last years, 
banks have increasingly transferred issued loans to credit institutions. This is a result of new 
regulation in 2007, which allowed for creation of covered bonds (OMF – obligasjoner med 
fortrinnsrett).  The condition was that the bonds should be issued in separate credit institutions. 
Since covered bonds are an affordable form of financing for banks, it has become an 
increasingly important source of funding (Bakke & Rakkestad, 2010).  
We also collect macroeconomic data on quarterly GDP growth for our whole sample period. 
The series is calculated from value-change in GDP for mainland Norway. The data is provided 
and seasonally adjusted by SSB. (Statistics Norway (SSB), 2015) 
1 See http://www.ssb.no/innrapportering/naeringsliv/orbof (in Norwegian) 
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Data on NIBOR 3-month lending rates is provided by Oslo Stock Exchange through 
Macrobond. The series is calculated as quarterly averages of daily trading rates on interbank 
lending for our whole sample period.   
4.1 Treatment of the data set 
Although the data set spans from 1991Q4, we choose to start our analysis in 1992 because of 
the banking crisis that occurred in Norway in the period 1988 to 1992. During this crisis, several 
of the largest Norwegian commercial banks were nationalized to avoid default (Gram, 2011).  
For analytical purposes, we omit banks that have less than or equal to 8 consecutive 
observations (two years or less) of the dependent variable 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 in our regressions. This 
reduces the dataset by 52 non-missing observations. Banks with a shorter life span than this add 
little explanatory power because of the lag structure in our econometric models. This leaves the 
dataset with 15732 observations spanning 92 quarters from 1992Q1 to 2014Q4. The number of 
panels (banks) varies from 156 to 136 in the sample period.  
There are certain data points that produce large outliers in our variables. Close analysis show 
that these outliers are associated with bankruptcies or startups, yielding either very large or very 
small values. We omit outliers that are 3 standard deviations above or below the median value 
for variables that are prone to calculation of extreme values2.  
4.2 Variables construction 
Using the available data, we construct variables in order to estimate the general model specified 
in equation (1). How we define and construct the dependent variable, as well as the competition 
and control variables, is explained below. 
4.2.1 Non-performing loan rates 
Non-performing loan rates is calculated as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans for 
each bank:  
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 
𝑁𝑜𝑛– 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∗ 100 
2 Affected variables are 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛, 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜.  
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A loan is considered non-performing when interest and principal payments have not been paid 
on time. At that time, the bank is required to estimate the expected loss on the loan (Berge & 
Boye, 2007).  
Since 2007, non-performing loans are reported for the banks’ legal entity. This means that for 
banks with foreign activity (DNB, Nordea, Santander and Eika Kredittbank), reported numbers 
of non-performing loans include loans made by the bank abroad. The result is that for these 
banks, the calculated 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 after 2007 reflect the rate of non-performing loans for all loans, 
not only domestic. However, the size of the loans made abroad only represents a small fraction 
of the loan portfolio. We therefore make the assumption that the 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 calculated for legal 
entity can be used as a proxy for the domestic 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 for these four banks. 
4.2.2 Concentration indexes 
We start by creating variables that measure the concentration in the banking market in each 
time period: 
C5-index: A measure representing the sum of the combined market shares of the five largest 
banks in loans market.  
𝐶5𝑡 =
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=𝑁−4
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
∗ 100 
Where 𝑁 is the total number of banks, sorted by the size of 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (𝐻𝐻𝐼) is calculated as the sum of squared market shares: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 = ∑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 has a range of 
1
𝑁
 – all have equal market shares, to 1 – one bank has the entire market. It 
is the most commonly used measure of market concentration. While the C5 index ignores the 
market share distribution of banks that are not among the five largest banks, 𝐻𝐻𝐼 includes the 
market shares of all banks and assigns greater weight to larger banks. 
As noted in the previous section, significant amounts of loans have been transferred from parent 
banks to subsidiary credit institutions since 2007. This affects our calculation of market shares 
for the banks. Based on comparisons of our estimates with reported consolidated market 
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shares3, our calculated market shares for the five largest banks range between 0.5-4 percent 
above consolidated numbers.  
4.2.3 Interest rate margin 
The level of competition in any market will have an effect on the firms’ profit margins.  In the 
case of banks, interest incomes from loans represent a significant part of their earnings base. 
The interest rate margin for each bank should therefore provide information about the bank’s 
degree of market power or the amount of competition this bank is subject to. This is in line with 
the view of the Norwegian Competition Authority. In a recent study, they argue that 
competition in the Norwegian mortgage market is insufficient on the basis of increasing interest 
rate margins (NCA, 2015).  
Since our dataset contains accounts for each bank’s total loans issued to customers and quarterly 
interest income, we are able to construct an implicit measure of the average interest rate charged 
on loans. The difference between this interest rate and the banks’ funding cost is a measure of 
the interest rate margin. 
When issuing a new loan to households and businesses, the marginal funding source will 
typically be bonds (Raknerud, Vatne, & Rakkestad, 2011). The interest rate on bonds can be 
divided into the money market rate (NIBOR) and a risk premium. The risk premiums will 
depend on both general market conditions and the perceived riskiness of the particular bank 
(Hoff, 2011), but are difficult to obtain for each bank.  
We construct a measure of the interest rate margin for loans applying the 3-month NIBOR 
(Norwegian Inter Bank Offer Rate) as a proxy for marginal funding cost:  
𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = (
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
− 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 ) ∗ 100 
A weakness of this measure is that it does not take into account the issuer-specific risk premium 
over NIBOR. The advantage is that NIBOR is a measure that reflects market conditions and is 
the main component of the banks’ marginal funding cost (NCA, 2015). 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 is denoted 
3 See https://www.fno.no/statistikk/bank/ for calculated consolidated market shares for the 10 
largest banks in Norway 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
19
in yearly percentages, in order to give intuitive interpretation in the analysis.  
4.2.4 The H-statistic 
As discussed in the section 2, the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) approach is a widespread method used in 
empirical studies of competition in the banking market. For a thorough review of different 
empirical specifications and the underlying assumptions of the model, see for example Bikker, 
Shaffer and Spierdijk (2012). 
In order to estimate the H-statistic for our data, we employ an empirical setup following Bikker 
and Haaf (2002). The general reduced form equation is: 
(2) 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐼 =  𝛼 + 𝜆𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑅 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐶𝐸 + ∑ 𝜉𝑗𝑗 𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑆𝐹𝑗 + 𝜂𝑙𝑛𝑂𝐼 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
Where II denotes total interest income, AFR is the annual funding rate, PPE is the price of 
personnel expenses and PCE is the price of capital expenditure. BSF controls for bank-specific 
control factors, and OI is the ratio of other income to total assets. The H-statistic is calculated 
as the sum of elasticities of interest income with respect to the included input prices. 
The sum of these elasticities can be used as a measure of the competitive environment in the 
market, since it should represent the firm’s ability to pass through changes in factor prices to 
its market. 𝐻 = 1 indicates perfect competition, since a change in factor prices should raise the 
equilibrium price by the same percentage. 0 < 𝐻 < 1 characterizes monopolistic competition, 
since the firm is able to pass through some of the cost increases by reducing its quantity to raise 
the price. 𝐻 < 0 indicates behavior in line with monopoly (Bikker & Spierdijk, 2008). 
Applying this setup to our data we end up with the following empirical reduced form equation:  
(3) 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜆 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛾 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛿 𝑙𝑛(𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜉1𝑙𝑛 (𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜉2𝑙𝑛 (𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜉3𝑙𝑛 (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜉4𝑙𝑛 (𝑒𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡) +
𝜉5𝐹𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜉6𝐹𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑙𝑛 (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is total interest income for bank 𝑖  in period 𝑡 . Most factor prices are directly 
unobservable. Following Bikker and Spierdijk (2008), we therefore use interest expenses over 
total funding (𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) to proxy for average funding rate, personnel expenses over total assets 
(𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡) to proxy for price of personnel expenses and total operating costs over fixed total 
assets (𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖,𝑡) for the price of capital expenditure.  
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The following variables control for bank-specific factors: the ratio of total loans to total assets 
(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡) controls for differences in credit risk. The ratio of non-earning assets to total 
assets (𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ) controls for efficiency. We include the ratio of deposits to short term 
funding ratio (𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡) and equity ratio (𝑒𝑞𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡) to control for funding composition. 
The ratio of non-interest income over interest income (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖,𝑡) controls for the degree of 
non-financial activities. Finally, we include dummies for subsidiaries of foreign banks 
(𝐹𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡) and foreign banks with a branch operating in Norway (𝐹𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡) to control for 
structural differences. In our setup the H-statistic becomes:  
𝐻– 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 𝜆 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 
Most commonly, the P-R approach in empirical studies assumes constant competition for the 
entire sample period resulting in a single H-statistic for each market. However, we are interested 
in studying how this measure can inform us on how competition in one market has changed 
over time.  
Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) suggest several ways to estimate the H-statistic in order to study 
the development in competition over time: 
- Calculate static estimates of the H-statistic for each period. According to the authors, 
this approach has the disadvantage of potentially yielding erratic patterns in the H-
statistic over time.  
- Repeatedly estimate the P-R equation using recursive least squares. This implies 
starting with a small sub-sample of the dataset and then expanding the sample period 
with one period at a time. This method allows for gradual change in the competitive 
environment, and results in quarterly estimates of the H-statistic for the Norwegian 
banking market.  
We also consider an approach where we calculate rolling window estimates. This approach 
provides us with the reliability of a static H-statistic calculation, but gives us enough variation 
to see changes in competition over time. In Appendix 1, we provide a plot illustrating the 
estimates of the H-statistic using the different methods. All estimates are obtained using pooled 
OLS with robust standard errors. Other estimators are also considered. In our analysis we use 
the H-statistic measure obtained through rolling window estimation. 
After years of empirical application, the H-statistic has shown to be quite unreliable. In a recent 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
21
paper by Spierdijk and Shaffer (2015) summarize the results of empirical papers employing the 
measure. The H-statistic is thoroughly examined using several standard theoretical models. The 
authors argue that the H-statistic does not take into account important market aspects such as 
cost differences, product differentiation, strategic decision variable, action sequencing or 
collusive behavior. They demonstrate that the measure could take on any value for any degree 
of competition when these important aspects are neglected, and that the H-statistic should not 
be considered a reliable measure of competition. 
Since the measure is common in banking literature we choose to include it in our analysis, but 
use caution when interpreting the associated results.  
4.2.5 Control variables 
We include the following variables controlling for bank-specific effects and macro trends, 
which may affect non-performing loan rates:  
Quarterly GDP growth (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) controls for the impact of business cycles on banks’ 
non-performing loan rates.  We include four lags of this variable, considering that effects from 
the business cycle often takes time to develop into non-performing loans on the banks’ balance 
sheets. Non-performing loan rates are likely to increase in bad times and decrease in times of 
economic growth. We therefore expect a negative effect of GDP growth on non-performing 
loan rates. The variable 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ is expressed in yearly growth-percentages.  
Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) measures the profitability of the bank. Our expectation for the 
estimated coefficient on this control variable is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is likely that a 
positive relationship exists between risk and return in the long run. However, high loan losses 
in particular years might cause a significant reduction in earnings, in which case the variable 
could have a negative effect on non-performing loans (Jiménez, Lopez, & Saurina, 2013).   
Market share (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒) is the bank’s market share in the loans market. While larger 
banks have benefits of scale such as risk-diversification, bank managers could also have the 
incentive to take advantage of this in order to push further along the risk profile of the bank. 
We therefore have no clear expectation of the sign on this variable’s estimated coefficient.  
Equity ratio (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) is calculated as equity over total assets. Although there are strict 
requirements to banks’ equity ratios, the funding structure of the banks varies substantially. A 
higher equity ratio could indicate a lower risk preference of the bank, which should imply less 
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risk. We therefore expect a negative relationship between 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 and non-performing 
loan rates.    
Lagged dependent variable: We include four lags of the dependent variable to take account 
for the persistency of the 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  variable. Non-performing loans may remain on banks’ 
balance sheets for several quarters. Four quarters of lagged values captures this persistence. We 
expect positive coefficients on the lagged dependent variables.  
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5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the variables included in our econometric model. In this 
section, we attempt to study these variables closer and provide explanations for developments 
and trends.  
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for regression variables 
 Mean Observations Median Min Max St. dev 
NPLrate 2.125 11948 1.47 0.00027 25.1 2.183 
       
C5 59.55 11948 60.06 54.5 64.3 2.498 
       
HHI 0.115 11948 0.11 0.082 0.17 0.025 
       
GDPgrowth 0.731 11948 0.61 -2.28 4.23 0.997 
       
Marketshare 0.692 11948 0.09 0.0022 36.4 2.685 
       
ROA 0.306 11948 0.30 -1.95 2.10 0.263 
       
Equityratio 10.33 11948 9.81 -45.4 50.8 3.910 
       
NIBOR 4.338 11941 3.97 1.48 8.22 2.013 
       
IRmargin 2.781 11941 2.57 -10.4 25.2 1.900 
       
H-statistic 0.270 11279 0.21 -1.23 1.79 0.653 
Note: The statistics are based on observations in the sample from regressions in Table 2 and Table 3, with the 
exception of NIBOR and IRmargin which are based on the corresponding sample from regressions in Table 4, 
and H-statistic which is based on the corresponding sample from regressions in Table 5. For summary statistics 
from the full sample for all variables, see Appendix 2. 
5.1 Non-performing loan rates 
Non-performing loans is a source of risk for each individual bank. As seen in the summary 
statistics table, 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 varies from rates close to zero to more than 25 percent. To further 
investigate the spread in non-performing loans over the sample period, we plot all observed 
values of 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒. Figure 1 shows a box plot of the quarterly non-performing loan rates, 
sorted by year. The blue boxes in the figure plot the interval from the 25th to 75th percentile, 
while the white line inside the box marks the median. The grey dots indicate observations that 
lay above the upper adjacent value, defined as 𝑈 = 𝑥75 +
3
2
(𝑥75 − 𝑥25), where 𝑥75  (𝑥25) 
represents the value at the 75th (25th) percentile (Tukey, 1977). 
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 Figure 1 
Note: The figure is based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
The box plot shows that there are several observations within each year that lie outside the 
upper adjacent value. Closer study reveals that many of these observations are related to banks’ 
starting period, as well as prior to bank closure. A large portion can also be accredited to a small 
group of banks. This could be due to the fact that some banks specialize within risky segments 
of the loan market, and therefore consistently operate with high levels of non-performing loans.  
The box plot also shows that both the median level and the variation in non-performing loan 
rates has declined since the beginning of the 1990’s. Figure 2 shows the aggregate non-
performing loans rate for the entire market, decomposed into enterprises and households.  
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 Figure 2 
Note: The figure is based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
The figures illustrate that after the banking crisis in the 1990s, the total non-performing loans 
rate has remained stable and low, varying between 1-2%. According to Norges Bank, the rate 
of non-performing loans in the economy was at a historic low before the financial crisis in 2008. 
This development has mainly been due to strong economic performance of the economy over 
the last two decades, as well as high debt growth in both the household and enterprise sectors 
(Berge & Boye, 2007).  
The non-performing portion of loans in the economy is determined by the ability of households 
and firms to repay their debts. This makes the non-performing loan rates a risk indicator for the 
economy. The need to control for macroeconomic conditions is confirmed from the figure. It 
also illustrates that non-performing loans from enterprises are more sensitive to variations in 
the business cycle. This is because households’ incentives to avoid bankruptcy is stronger 
compared to that of enterprises (Norges Bank, 2014, p. 35).  
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5.2 Market structure 
Two of the measures we use to proxy for competition are concentration indexes, calculated on 
the basis of market shares for individual banks. To get a clear picture of how market 
concentration has developed over the sample period, we provide a graph of 𝐶5  and 𝐻𝐻𝐼 
indexes for the loans market in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
Note: The figure is based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
The combined market shares of the 5 largest banks (𝐶5) range between 55 and 65 percent over 
the sample period. Both measures show that concentration has increased since the beginning of 
the last decade.  
Several major developments in the banking market have occurred over the last decades, which 
have influenced the level of concentration. From 1992 to the end of 2014, there has been a 
general decrease in the number of banks operating in Norway. The number of savings banks 
has been the main driver of this decrease, starting at 140 savings banks in 1992 to 107 banks in 
2014 (Sparebankforeningen). The total number of banks has decreased from 156 to 136 over 
the same period.  
In 1994 the EEA agreement opened up the Norwegian market for foreign banks. Today, banks 
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with foreign ownership are among the largest in the Norwegian market, including 
Handelsbanken (branch of foreign bank), Danske Bank (branch of foreign bank), and Nordea 
(subsidiary). This shows that foreign banks are able to compete with domestic banks in the 
Norwegian market.  
An event that made a large impact on market concentration was the 2003 merger between DnB 
and Gjensidige NOR, which at the time were the two largest banks operating in Norway. The 
market share of total loans for the new bank, DNB Bank ASA, was 38 percent after the merger. 
The event is visible from the spike in 𝐻𝐻𝐼. This measure puts greater emphasis on larger banks, 
since it is calculated as the sum of squared market shares. The increase is not as visible from 
the plot of the C5-index, since the merger only increased this measure by the market share of 
the 6th largest bank moving up to 5th place.  
The market share of each bank is also included as a control variable in our econometric model. 
Summary statistics for this variable show that the maximum value of market shares is more 
than 13 standard deviations away from the mean. The reason is that the Norwegian banking 
market consists of a few national branch-networks, as well as a large group of small banks only 
operating in regional and local markets. To illustrate, the combined market share in the gross 
loans market of the 100 smallest banks was only 8.4 %, compared to a 64,5% market share of 
the 5 largest banks, at the end of 2014.  
5.3 Interest rate margins and profitability 
The interest rate margin variable may capture competitive behavior by measuring the margin 
that a bank is able to charge on its loans above the funding cost. The summary statistics of the 
𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛  reveals that the variable is subject to considerable variation, even after being 
trimmed for outliers.  
Figure 4 plots the yearly averages of 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛, for the entire market. Even though this graph 
aggregates the interest rate margin over all banks and within each year, it illustrates that the 
measure is sensitive to market fluctuations. In their 2015 study, the NCA argued that the 
average interest rate margin has been increasing in recent years. They use a sample period from 
2007-2015 to make this point. This trend is also evident in our graph. However, when viewed 
in a larger historical context, interest rate margins for recent years lie close to the average 
margin for the whole sample. 
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 Figure 4 
Note: The figure is based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
An interesting question is whether or not the increasing interest rate margins allows for greater 
profits, or if it is a result of increasing costs in the banking industry. This has been a subject of 
particular interest in the debate in Norway since the introduction of new capital requirements.  
In Figure 5, we decompose banks’ profits from 1992 to 2014 into net interest income, personnel 
expenses and operating costs. Net interest income is defined as 𝑁𝐼 =  (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 −
 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠). All variables are calculated as percentages of total assets and weighted 
according to the bank’s relative size of assets. 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
29
 Figure 5 
Note: The figure is based on the full sample of the variables as provided in Appendix 2. 
Figure 5 shows that pre-tax profits in the Norwegian banking sector have on average been 1% 
of total assets the last 20 years. Profitability has varied with the business cycle and has, with 
the exception of 1992, remained between 0,5% and 1,5%. Although net interest income has 
been decreasing over the entire time span, profitability has been maintained. An explanation 
may be the corresponding decrease in both operating costs and personnel expenses, both 
significant cost figures. This indicates that Norwegian banks have become increasingly efficient 
over the last two decades.  
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6. Estimation methods 
6.1 Choice of estimator 
6.1.1 Fixed effects estimator 
Since we are using panel data, the error term in our equation contains both a firm-specific effect 
that remains constant over time as well as a time- and firm varying component: 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. 
One can think of several factors unique for each bank that stay constant over time, that also 
have an effect on the non-performing loans ratio: management style, banking specialization and 
ownership structure. Some of these factors will be difficult to control for with explicit variables 
and will evidently be a part of the error term. These omitted factors are called fixed effects.  
An issue when estimating our model is that these fixed effects are a potential source of 
endogeneity. Bank-specific fixed effects will likely affect our control variables such as 𝑅𝑂𝐴 
and 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜. In this case, using a standard OLS estimator will cause our estimates to be 
biased and inconsistent.  
One way of getting rid of these firm-specific effects is by using a within-group transformation, 
also called the fixed effects estimator. This estimator transforms the equation to deviations from 
each variable’s mean. This mean is calculated as the time average within each panel (group). 
Since time average of firm-specific effects 𝑎𝑖 is just 𝑎𝑖 itself, fixed effects are eliminated from 
the error term:  
(4) 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 − 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
4
𝑗=1 +
𝛽5(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
2 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) +
∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢?̅? 
where 𝑋?̅? =
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1+𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2+⋯+𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑇
𝑇
 is the within-group mean of variable 𝑋. 
 
Unfortunately, lagged dependent variables make the fixed effects estimator biased. This is 
apparent when considering that the fixed effects estimator transforms the equation to deviations 
from individual means. Since the within-group mean of the error term contains all realizations 
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of the disturbances, it is likely to introduce endogeneity into the equation. 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 will 
for instance be correlated with its corresponding error term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1. Including more lags of this 
variable increases the endogeneity problem.  
6.1.2 First Differencing in OLS 
Another way of getting rid of the fixed effects is first differencing. Subtracting the first time 
lag from the contemporaneous value eliminates these effects, provided they are constant over 
time. The error term now contains one lag of the disturbance since ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1. This 
term is by definition correlated with the first term of ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 and the coefficient on this variable will be biased when transforming to first 
differences. However, with first differencing we have the option of using an instrumental 
variable-approach. This will allow us to keep the lags and still achieve an unbiased model. 
6.1.3 Instrumental variables 
Anderson and Hsiao estimators can be applied to solve the endogeneity problem (Anderson & 
Hsiao, 1982). This estimator proposes using either the second lag in differences Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2 
or the second lag in levels 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−2  as instruments for the first differenced lagged 
dependent variable Δ𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 , in a 2SLS instrument variable estimation.  They both 
satisfy the instrumental variable relevance condition and are not endogenous in our first 
differenced specification. An additional advantage is that they are available internally in our 
dataset. We refer to this method as IV-regression. 
Since we are able to use lagged values of already existing variables, we should also consider 
including more lags in order to improve the explanatory power of the first stage regression. If 
further lags give more information, including them will improve the efficiency of the model. 
However, for every lag we include as instruments we reduce the sample size by one time period. 
If we for instance instrument the differenced lagged dependent variable with five lags in levels, 
we would have to start the estimation in period 7. Consequently, this would cause us to lose 6 
quarters of observations. Even though many of the banks in our dataset have over 90 quarters 
of observations, some have a substantially shorter lifespan. If we would like to use the 
information from these impermanent banks, we need to preserve time periods.  
One way to bypass this tradeoff between model efficiency and sample size is the use of the 
General Method of Moments-estimator (GMM). By using an instrumental variables matrix, the 
GMM-estimator is able to use different instruments for different periods in the estimation. 
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Earlier periods with fewer lags available are included in the estimation with as many lags as 
possible. This way, maximum 2 time periods are lost. Generally, GMM attempts to fit the 
model:  
(5) 𝑦 = 𝑥′𝐵 + 𝜀 
Where 𝑥 is a column vector of k regressors, 𝑦 and 𝜀 are random variables. By imposing moment 
conditions on the error terms for every instrumental variable it ensures consistency for the 
model. In general, the moment conditions require all instrumental variables to be uncorrelated 
with the error terms:  
(6) 𝐸[𝜀|𝑧] = 0 
Where 𝑧  is a column vector of j instruments. For N observations vectors x, y and z have 
corresponding matrices X, Y and Z. Our instrument matrix Z with j rows then has the following 
structure, following Arellano & Bond (1991):  
(7) 𝑍 =
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 …
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 0 0 0 0 0 …
0 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,2 0 0 0 …
0 0 0 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,2 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,3 …
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱]
 
 
 
 
 
By imposing the moments conditions to equal 0, GMM estimates regressors that are orthogonal 
to the errors. In other words: coefficients should be exogenous and unbiased. Imposing further 
moment conditions improves efficiency if the additional condition introduces more 
information.  
The structure of the instrument matrix leaves the total number of instruments very large in 
panels with many time periods. There is no absolute rule of how many instruments is excessive, 
though it is recommended that they should be less than the number of groups (Roodman, 2009). 
Since many of the instrumental variables are recurring, we can collapse the matrix to save on a 
lot of instruments. This reduces the instrument number in the matrix drastically.  
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(8) 𝑍 =
[
 
 
 
 
0 0 0 ⋯
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 0 0 ⋯
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,2 0 ⋯
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,1 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,2 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,3 ⋯
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋱]
 
 
 
 
 
This matrix is used to obtain the GMM estimate:  
(9) ?̂?𝐴 = (𝑋′𝑍𝐴𝑍′𝑋)
−1 𝑋′𝑍𝐴𝑍′𝑌  
Where A is the weighting matrix assigning weight to the moment conditions. 
6.1.4 Estimator decisions 
Since the GMM estimator involves matrix calculations in multiple steps and complex 
instrument structures, it is crucial that we are careful when making choices about the 
construction of this estimator.  
First we must decide on how many lags of the dependent variable to include in the instrument 
matrix. The ideal number of instruments is the one that explains the variation in 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
which is exogenous to the differenced error term, and only this variation. There is a danger of 
overfitting the first step with too many lags. An overidentified model is not able to appropriately 
satisfy the moment conditions, which implies that the instruments cloud be endogenous with 
the errors.  
We test the optimal lag structure using the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. To follow 
the Hansen-test mechanically is risky, since the test is weakened by an increasing number of 
instruments. 9 lags is recommended by the Hansen test, while 10 lags makes the model 
overidentified. As Roodman (2009) advises, we choose to be conservative, and employ 7 lags 
in order to avoid the risk of overfitting the model.  
Our model is robust to variations in the number of instruments. This lag structure is appropriate 
for all our specifications. We choose to instrument our differenced variable in lagged levels to 
preserve one time period.  
In order to calculate estimates that satisfy the moment conditions, GMM uses a matrix to weight 
the elements of the variance-covariance matrix. Estimation happens in either one or two steps.  
If our errors are identically and independently distributed, the weighting matrix A becomes the 
one from the 2SLS-estimator (Roodman, 2009). However, our error terms can both be 
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heteroscedastic and can inhibit arbitrary patterns of covariance or autocorrelation within 
groups. This requires a weighting matrix that is based on the structure of the error terms. This 
is achieved by using initial error estimates from the two-step estimator to generate a weighting 
matrix giving efficient and robust estimate in the second step. In finite samples, this procedure 
can yield implausibly small standard errors, because the weighting matrix for the errors is 
calculated from their own variances and covariances, resulting in data mining (Roodman, 
2009). Windmeijer (2005) finds a method for correcting this finite-sample inaccuracy by 
expressing the coefficient estimator as a function of the initial step weighting matrix. The 
corrected two-step estimator is more efficient and more accurate than the simpler one-step 
estimator. (Windmeijer, 2005)  
Normal first difference transformation in general imposes a problem to data sets with gaps. 
Since two time observations are needed to construct one difference, gaps in observations will 
be magnified. GMM estimation provides the option of applying our orthogonal deviations 
rather than normal first differences to remedy this problem. Since Norwegian banks are required 
to report for every quarter of operation, our dataset does not suffer from many gaps in 
observations. We therefore apply normal first differences.  
To summarize, we use a two-step estimation in normal first differences, with Windmeijer 
correction and robust standard errors clustered in individuals. We use 7 lags in the instrument 
matrix in addition to the other regressors also present as instruments. 
6.2 Model diagnostics 
In our regression tables, we list the results from estimating our model using both OLS, fixed 
effects, IV-regression and GMM. While only IV-regressions and GMM-regressions can be 
considered unbiased, the OLS and FE estimations provide an upper and lower bound for the 
endogenous first lag of the dependent variable. In OLS, the lagged dependent variable is 
positively correlated with the error term, resulting in an upward bias on the estimated 
coefficient. Correspondingly, the fixed effects coefficient has a downward bias, since the 
included group mean of the transformed lagged variable is negatively correlated with that of 
the transformed error term (Roodman, 2009). This provides a robustness check for the unbiased 
IV- and GMM- estimates. 
6.2.1 Model consistency: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
For OLS and FE regressions, we test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, modified for non-
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normality of the errors. In our IV- and GMM-regressions, we use the Breusch-
Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg-test for heteroskedasticity (Breusch & Pagan, 1979). For all 
our specifications, the test rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the standard errors. 
We therefore report our results with clustered standard errors.  
Another implication of the lag structure is the need to eliminate autocorrelation. Autocorrelation 
is problematic in GMM because the lagged instruments we are assuming to be exogenous are 
correlated with the differenced error term. By definition, the transformed error term ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑢𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 is mathematically correlated with its lag ∆𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−2 via the shared 
term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1. For an unbiased model, we therefore need to reject the null hypothesis of no first 
order autocorrelation, but not for second order autocorrelation. For all IV and GMM-
specifications we report the Arellano-Bond-test (Arellano & Bond, 1991) for first- and second 
order autocorrelation labeled m1 and m2, respectively.  
We also report test statistics from the Hansen-tests for overidentifying restrictions for the GMM 
regressions, and Wald-tests for joint significance of the coefficients for all models.  
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7. Results  
7.1 Using concentration indexes as measures of competition 
The first set of regressions use concentration indexes C5 and HHI as measures of competition. 
Table 2 shows regression results using different estimators in testing the relationship between 
our dependent variable 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, and the C5 concentration index.  
The results from using our preferred estimator, GMM, are listed in column 4. We include results 
from using OLS, FE and IV estimators in columns 1-3 to allow for robustness checks. Yearly 
and seasonal dummies are included in all regressions.  
Both the OLS and FE estimators are expected to produce biased estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable. However, since these estimators are biased in opposite directions, they 
provide an upper and lower bound for the unbiased estimate. As a robustness test, Bond (2002) 
therefore suggests to compare the sum of coefficients for the lags of the dependent variable 
from GMM estimation with that of OLS and FE. The sum of coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variables is reported as SUM LDV at bottom of Table 2. We see from column 4 that 
the GMM estimator produces coefficients that lie within the boundaries indicated by OLS and 
FE estimations.  
While both the IV and GMM estimators should result in unbiased estimates, GMM is expected 
to be more efficient. Comparing column 3 and 4, we see that these estimators produce similar 
estimates. Following Bond (2002), we use only one lag as an instrument for the lagged 
dependent variable in our IV estimator, to ensure that all results are estimated over the same 
sample period. 
We test for first and second order autocorrelation in the instrumental variable and GMM 
estimations. The t-statistics for the m2 test indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
second order autocorrelation. The Hansen test shows that the GMM estimation is not 
overidentified, indicating that the moment conditions are satisfied. These diagnostic tests 
indicate that our model is well specified.   
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 Table 2 - Regression results using C5 as the competition variable 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽j(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡e𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐶5𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶5𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE (3) IV-reg (4) GMM 
Competition variable     
C5t -1.0774*** -0.9834*** -0.8612** -0.8264** 
 (0.3232) (0.3107) (0.3377) (0.3377) 
     
C52t 0.0085*** 0.0077*** 0.0067** 0.0064** 
 (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Lagged dependent variable    
NPLratei,t-1 0.5675*** 0.5209*** 0.5939*** 0.5708*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0285) (0.0535) (0.0419) 
     
NPLratei,t-2 0.1937*** 0.1722*** 0.2013*** 0.1980*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0251) (0.0293) (0.0271) 
     
NPLratei,t-3 0.0613*** 0.0485*** 0.0576*** 0.0555*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0219) (0.0166) 
     
NPLratei,t-4 0.0658*** 0.0515*** 0.0372* 0.0312** 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0214) (0.0138) 
Control Variables 
    
GDPgrowtht-1 -0.0500*** -0.0478*** -0.0145 -0.0246 
 (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0192) (0.0179) 
     
GDPgrowtht-2 -0.0563*** -0.0544*** -0.0084 -0.0155 
 (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0179) (0.0172) 
     
GDPgrowtht-3 -0.1346*** -0.1294*** -0.0739*** -0.0807*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0175) (0.0171) 
     
GDPgrowtht-4 -0.0369*** -0.0356*** -0.0144 -0.0174 
 (0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0154) (0.0153) 
     
ROAi,t -0.1497** -0.1567** -0.0941 -0.0940 
 (0.0578) (0.0648) (0.0700) (0.0696) 
     
Marketsharei,t -0.0088*** 0.0197 0.0253 0.0374 
 (0.0030) (0.0363) (0.0674) (0.0687) 
     
Equityratioi,t 0.0023 -0.0049 0.0474 0.0494 
 (0.0032) (0.0112) (0.0432) (0.0451) 
Observations 11948 11948 11948 11948 
Sum LDV 0.8884 0.7932 0.8900 0.8555 
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st order AC - m1   -7.598 -7.284 
2nd order AC - m2   -0.234 -0.584 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test    0.409 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i at time t (NPLratei,t). C5 is a 
market concentration index, calculated as the combined market shares in the loans market for the 5 largest banks at time 
t. GDPt is the quarterly GDP growth rate at time t. ROAi,t, is return of assets of bank i at time t. Marketsharei,t is the 
market share in the loans market of bank i at time t. Equityratioit is defined as the amount of equity over total assets for 
bank i at time t.  m1 and m2 show t-values of the Arrelano-Bond test for first- and second order autocorrelation. We 
report p-values of the Wald-test, which tests for joint significance of the estimated coefficients. The Hansen test tests the 
model for overidentification. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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The estimated coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable are all significant and positive. 
The coefficient on the first lag is 0.59, confirming that the level of non-performing loans that 
banks hold in their balance is persistent.  
The negative signs on the 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ variables confirm that increased economic growth in 
previous quarters decreases the rate of non-performing loans. However, the only significant 
term is the third lag of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ. This indicates that it takes three quarters for a change in 
GDP growth to have a significant impact on the ability to service debt in the economy.  
Our bank-specific control variables 𝑅𝑂𝐴 , 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  and 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  turn out 
insignificant in explaining non-performing loan rates. This may indicate that the majority of 
differences between banks are controlled for when removing fixed effects.  
Our main relationship of interest is of how concentration affects the riskiness of the banks loan 
portfolio. The GMM estimation finds a significant non-linear relationship between the C5 
concentration index and non-performing loan rates. The estimated linear coefficient is negative 
while the coefficient on the squared term is positive, both significant on the 5% level. The 
inflection point is 64.3, which lies within the range of observed values for the C5 concentration 
index.  
We find similar results when applying a different concentration measure to proxy for 
competition: the HHI concentration index. Results for these regressions are summarized in 
Table 3. The linear term is significantly negative at the 5% level, and the squared term is 
significantly positive at the 10% level. The inflection point is 0.17, which is also the maximum 
value for 𝐻𝐻𝐼 observed over our sample period. The model diagnostics and the significance of 
control variables remains the same when we use a different concentration index. 
These findings support a U-shaped relationship between concentration and the riskiness of the 
banks’ loan portfolios. For low levels of market concentration, increases in concentration has a 
negative effect on non-performing loan rates. Past the inflection point, this relationship is 
reversed; higher market concentration increases non-performing loan rates.  
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 Table 3 - Regression results using HHI as measure of competition 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽j(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE (3) IV-reg (4) GMM 
Competition variable     
HHIt -39.0500*** -37.9957*** -29.3052** -28.9355** 
 (12.3319) (12.0087) (14.2669) (14.3092) 
     
HHI2t 115.5277** 113.1376** 84.5719* 85.0439* 
 (45.8119) (44.7510) (51.3251) (51.5124) 
Lagged dependent variable    
NPLratei,t-1 0.5669*** 0.5203*** 0.5823*** 0.5603*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0284) (0.0519) (0.0409) 
     
NPLratei,t-2 0.1931*** 0.1717*** 0.1963*** 0.1945*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0252) (0.0292) (0.0272) 
     
NPLratei,t-3 0.0620*** 0.0490*** 0.0556*** 0.0547*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0216) (0.0163) 
     
NPLratei,t-4 0.0662*** 0.0518*** 0.0364* 0.0312** 
 (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0213) (0.0137) 
Control Variables     
GDPgrowtht-1 -0.0559*** -0.0528*** -0.0162 -0.0271 
 (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0191) (0.0177) 
     
GDPgrowtht-2 -0.0578*** -0.0555*** -0.0085 -0.0158 
 (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0174) 
     
GDPgrowtht-3 -0.1303*** -0.1249*** -0.0706*** -0.0781*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0170) 
     
GDPgrowtht-4 -0.0345** -0.0332** -0.0122 -0.0158 
 (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0155) (0.0153) 
     
ROAi,t -0.1509*** -0.1580** -0.0967 -0.0955 
 (0.0579) (0.0649) (0.0695) (0.0691) 
     
Marketsharei,t -0.0088*** 0.0195 0.0232 0.0351 
 (0.0030) (0.0360) (0.0662) (0.0672) 
     
Equityratioi,t 0.0025 -0.0044 0.0490 0.0508 
 (0.0032) (0.0112) (0.0426) (0.0444) 
Observations 11948 11948 11948 11948 
Sum LDV 0.8882 0.7929 0.8706 0.8407 
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st order AC - m1   -7.542 -7.212 
2nd order AC - m2   -0.249 -0.646 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test    0.374 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i at time t (NPLratei,t). C5 is a 
market concentration index, calculated as the combined market shares in the loans market for the 5 largest banks at time 
t. GDPt is the quarterly GDP growth rate at time t. ROAi,t, is return of assets of bank i at time t. Marketsharei,t is the 
market share in the loans market of bank i at time t. Equityratioi,t is defined as the amount of equity over total assets for 
bank i at time t.  m1 and m2 show t-values of the Arrelano-Bond test for first- and second order autocorrelation. We 
report p-values of the Wald-test, which tests for joint significance of the estimated coefficients. The Hansen test tests the 
model for overidentification. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
40
We wish to interpret both short-term and long-term effects of changes in concentration on non-
performing loan rates. We calculate the long-run coefficients by assuming equilibrium, which 
is denoted 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̃ 𝑖: 
(10) 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̃ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̃ 𝑖
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
2 +
∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Which can be rewritten as:  
(11) 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒̃ 𝑖 =
1
1−∑ 𝛽𝑗
4
𝑗=1
{𝛽0 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
2 +
∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡} 
The long-run coefficients are therefore obtained by dividing the short-run coefficients with 
(1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑗
4
𝑗=1 ), which is 1 minus SUM LDV. For 𝐶5, the long-term coefficient on the linear 
term is ?̂?5
𝐿𝑅 = −5,72 and ?̂?6
𝐿𝑅 = 0,044 on the squared term. For 𝐻𝐻𝐼, these values are ?̂?5
𝐿𝑅 =
−181,64 and ?̂?6
𝐿𝑅 = 533,86. While the short- and long-run coefficients differ in magnitude, 
the inflection points are the same. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrate the estimated relationships between non-performing loan rates 
and concentration measures 𝐶5 and 𝐻𝐻𝐼. The x-axis plots values of the relevant concentration 
index. Movement to the right along the x-axis implies increased concentration. The grey area 
represents the range of concentration values found in our sample. We use the y-axis to plot 
predicted values of 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 in order to illustrate how a change in concentration will affect 
levels of non-performing loan rates. The left y-axis shows the short run effect of concentration 
changes on non-performing loan rates. The right y-axis plots values corresponding to the long 
run effect.  
Constant terms and firm specific effects are removed with GMM estimation. Therefore, the 
levels of the y-axes in our graphs are normalized so that the average of the predicted values 
within the sample equals the 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 variable average.  
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 Figure 6 
Note: The insample values are based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
Predicted values are based on estimations from regression (4) in Table 2. 
 
Figure 7 
Note: The insample values are based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
Predicted values are based on estimations from regression (4) in Table 3. 
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The U-shaped relationship illustrated in these figures supports the theoretical model proposed 
by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010), as discussed in the section 2. They suggest that only in 
markets with low levels of competition will increased competition reduce the riskiness of banks. 
This is in line with our findings, to the extent that concentration is an appropriate measure of 
competition. 
The intuition behind this relationship, according to MMR, is that two opposing effects impact 
the relationship between competition and the risk profile of banks. On one hand, lower 
competition allows banks to operate with higher margins. This makes banks take less risk in 
order to protect their earnings. On the other hand, when interest rates become too high, loan 
customers are more likely to default on their payment obligations. This is referred to as the risk-
shifting effect.  
Within our sample range of 𝐶5, the effect of concentration on non-performing loan rates is 
mostly negative. The mean observation value for 𝐶5 is 59,8. For this concentration level, a 
percentage-point increase in the combined market share for the 5 largest banks reduces the 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 by 0,06 percentage points in the short run. The long-run effect is a decrease of 0,44 
percentage points.  
The HHI variable has a mean value of 0,115, which is also below the inflection point. At this 
concentration level, the short-run effect of an increase of 0,01 in 𝐻𝐻𝐼 is a 0,09 percentage point 
reduction in 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 . The long-run effect at this point is a decrease in 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  of 0,58 
percentage points.  
The estimated inflection points for both 𝐻𝐻𝐼 and 𝐶5 are relatively high compared to observed 
values over the sample period. This could imply that increases in concentration have for the 
most part contributed to reductions in non-performing loan rates for Norwegian banks. 
However, the level of concentration as measured by both C5 and HHI has exhibited a positive 
trend for the last 5 years. In fact, the concentration level in the last period of our sample (2014, 
Q4) is among the highest observed values of concentration for the last 20 years. While the last 
observed HHI index is still below the inflection point, the C5 index in this quarter is at the 
inflection point of 64,3. Our regression results therefore indicate that a continued positive trend 
in bank concentration will increase non-performing loan rates.  
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7.2 Using interest rate margin as the measure of competition 
Table 4 reports the regression results using interest rate margins as the measure of competition. 
𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 is calculated as of the difference between the average interest rate on loans and the 
3-month NIBOR rate. The variable is included in the model as a two-period moving average. 
We expect 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 to be endogenous when included as a contemporaneous variable in our 
specification. One possible solution would be to instrument 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 with lagged values of 
itself. However, instrumenting will produce a very large GMM instrument matrix, threatening 
the satisfaction of the moment conditions and the validity of the model. We therefore employ 
the second lag of the 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 as the explanatory variable, which is assumed to be exogenous. 
Theoretically, this is also valid since it takes time for risky investments to develop into non-
performing loans on banks’ balance sheets. Regressions using the instrumented first lag produce 
similar results, although this specification is found to be overidentified.  
Control variables are similar to those in the regressions using concentration indexes. The effect 
of GDP growth is negative in all periods, but only the third lag is significant at the 1% level. 
All firm-specific control variables are insignificant in explaining 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒. Both yearly and 
seasonal dummy variables are included in all regressions.  
Model diagnostics show that the both GMM and IV-reg estimations are free from 
autocorrelation. The GMM model is not found to be overidentified by the Hansen test. As a 
robustness check, we see that the results from IV-reg in column 3 and GMM in column 4 are 
very similar. SUM LDV from both these regressions lie within the boundaries set by the OLS 
and FE regressions in column 1 and 2.  
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 Table 4 - Regression results using interest rate margin as competition variable 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽j(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE (3) IV-reg (4) GMM 
Competition variable     
IRmargini,t-2 0.0277** -0.0050 -0.0438*** -0.0442*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0104) (0.0169) (0.0171) 
     
Lagged dependent variable    
NPLratei,t-1 0.5645*** 0.5197*** 0.5670*** 0.5654*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0283) (0.0499) (0.0399) 
     
NPLratei,t-2 0.1914*** 0.1719*** 0.1920*** 0.1918*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0292) (0.0273) 
     
NPLratei,t-3 0.0593*** 0.0480*** 0.0539** 0.0547*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0216) (0.0165) 
     
NPLratei,t-4 0.0673*** 0.0532*** 0.0362* 0.0342** 
 (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0212) (0.0136) 
Control Variables 
    
GDPgrowtht-1 -0.0739*** -0.0664*** -0.0242 -0.0280* 
 (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0179) (0.0170) 
     
GDPgrowtht-2 -0.0678*** -0.0686*** -0.0258 -0.0291* 
 (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0170) (0.0163) 
     
GDPgrowtht-3 -0.1254*** -0.1294*** -0.0859*** -0.0898*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0139) (0.0177) (0.0170) 
     
GDPgrowtht-4 -0.0286** -0.0337** -0.0196 -0.0208 
 (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0152) (0.0151) 
     
ROAi,t -0.1744*** -0.1618** -0.0997 -0.0997 
 (0.0602) (0.0656) (0.0693) (0.0683) 
     
Marketsharei,t -0.0085*** 0.0166 0.0142 0.0202 
 (0.0028) (0.0355) (0.0643) (0.0639) 
     
Equityratioi,t 0.0015 -0.0039 0.0517 0.0546 
 (0.0033) (0.0112) (0.0417) (0.0420) 
Observations 11941 11941 11941 11941 
Sum LDV 0.8825 0.7928 0.8491 0.8461 
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st order AC - m1   -7.500 -7.344 
2nd order AC - m2   -0.361 -0.221 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test    0.868 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i at time t (NPLratei,t). 
IRmargini,t-2 is the interest rate margin of bank i at time t-2. IRmargin is calculated as the difference between the ratio of 
gross interest income over gross total loans of bank i at time t, and the 3-month Norwegian Inter Bank Offer Rate at time 
t. GDPt is the quarterly GDP growth rate at time t. ROAi,t, is return of assets of bank i at time t. Marketshareit is the 
market share in the loans market of bank i at time t. Equityratioi,t is defined as the amount of equity over total assets for 
bank i at time t.  m1 and m2 show t-values of the Arrelano-Bond test for first- and second order autocorrelation. We report 
p-values of the Wald-test, which tests for joint significance of the estimated coefficients. The Hansen test tests the model  
for overidentification. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Figure 8 
Note: The insample values are based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
Predicted values are based on estimations from regression (4) in Table 4. 
Figure 8 graphs the predicted values for 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 at different levels of 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛. The left y-
axis plots the impact on 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 in the short run, while the right y-axis plots the long-run 
effect. The grey area represents a 95% confidence interval for the values of 𝐼𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 in our 
sample.  
We do not find a significant non-linear relationship between the interest rate margin and non-
performing loan rates. However, we find a negative linear relationship, significant at the 5% 
level. The estimated coefficient implies that a 1 percentage point increase in a bank’s interest 
rate margin decreases its non-performing loan rate by 0,044 percentage points in the short run. 
The long run coefficient equals ?̂?5
𝐿𝑅 =
0,044
(1−0,8461)
= 0,29 so that an equal permanent change in 
the interest rate margin decreases the non-performing loan rate by 0,29 percentage points.  
These findings support the franchise value hypothesis, which proposes that reductions in 
interest rate margins increase banks’ risk taking. When interest margins are low, banks have a 
lower opportunity cost of going bankrupt and will be more inclined to make loans to riskier 
customers (Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz, 2000). We should keep in mind that interest rate 
margins only capture competitive behavior that is reflected in market interest rates. If the banks 
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compete using other strategic variables like loan volume or marketing, the interest rate margin 
will not capture all competitive behavior. Still, our findings support the existence of a risk-
motivating incentive at falling interest rate margins.  
7.3 Using H-statistic as the measure of competition 
Table 5 reports the regression results using the rolling-window H-statistic to measure 
competition. Since the H-statistic is calculated from markup elasticities, we also lag this 
measure two periods to avoid endogeneity. The calculation of 𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 is explained in section 
4.2.4 with further discussion in Appendix 1.   
Model diagnostics reveal that both GMM and IV-reg estimations are free from autocorrelation. 
The GMM-model is not overidentified by the Hansen test. SUM LDV from IV-reg and GMM 
regressions in column 3 and 4 lie within the boundaries set by OLS and FE. 
Control variables remain unchanged in significance from previous regressions; only the third 
lag of 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  is significant at the 1% level. The first two lags of GDP growth and 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 switch signs to being positive, although the coefficients are still not significant. 
The Wald-test for joint significance rejects the null hypothesis of all-zero coefficients.  
We find a positive linear relationship between 𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡  and 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  with a coefficient of 
0,2491, although only significant at the 10% level. Theoretically, a higher number of the H-
statistic indicates stronger competition. Our findings therefore indicate that a rise in competition 
increases the rate of non-performing loans for all the banks in the loan market. An increase 
from 0 – associated with monopolistic competition, to 1 – associated with perfect competition, 
increases the average non-performing loan rate for the whole market by 0,2491 percentage 
points. The long run coefficient equals ?̂?5
𝐿𝑅 =
0,2491
(1−0,8389)
= 1,55 , implying that perfect 
competition on average is associated with a 1,55 percentage points higher 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, compared 
to the case of monopoly.  
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 Table 5 - Regression results using H-statistic as competition variable 
 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽j(𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
4
𝑗=1 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡−2 + ∑ 𝜅𝑛(
𝑀
𝑛=1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡,𝑛) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Variables (1) OLS (2) FE (3) IV-reg (4) GMM 
Competition variable     
Hstatt-2 0.3111*** 0.3346*** 0.2406* 0.2491* 
 (0.0928) (0.0906) (0.1357) (0.1362) 
     
Lagged dependent variable    
NPLratei,t-1 0.5551*** 0.5046*** 0.5440*** 0.5562*** 
 (0.0326) (0.0304) (0.0409) (0.0390) 
     
NPLratei,t-2 0.1897*** 0.1648*** 0.1811*** 0.1850*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0263) (0.0293) (0.0297) 
     
NPLratei,t-3 0.0702*** 0.0517*** 0.0581** 0.0650*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0235) (0.0188) 
     
NPLratei,t-4 0.0703*** 0.0467*** 0.0282 0.0326** 
 (0.0180) (0.0177) (0.0216) (0.0146) 
Control Variables     
GDPgrowtht-1 -0.0579*** -0.0530*** -0.0184 -0.0182 
 (0.0177) (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0194) 
     
GDPgrowtht-2 -0.0508*** -0.0466*** -0.0042 -0.0073 
 (0.0170) (0.0165) (0.0209) (0.0206) 
     
GDPgrowtht-3 -0.1253*** -0.1177*** -0.0594*** -0.0602*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0142) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
     
GDPgrowtht-4 -0.0379*** -0.0359*** -0.0131 -0.0128 
 (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
     
ROAi,t -0.1580** -0.1615** -0.0590 -0.0450 
 (0.0639) (0.0746) (0.0799) (0.0780) 
     
Marketsharei,t -0.0098*** -0.0055 0.0073 -0.0007 
 (0.0035) (0.0282) (0.0660) (0.0635) 
     
Equityratioi,t 0.0030 0.0012 0.0341 0.0353 
 (0.0029) (0.0125) (0.0438) (0.0433) 
Observations 11279 11279 11279 11279 
Sum LDV 0.8853 0.7678 0.8114 0.8389 
Seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1st order AC - m1   -7.475 -7.267 
2nd order AC - m2   -0.094 0.236 
Wald test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test    0.711 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes: The dependent variable the is ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i at time t 
(NPLratei,t). Hstatt-2 is the H-statistic, a competitive measure of the loans market at time t. It estimated as the 
sum of elasticities of interest income to input prices for all banks at time t-2.  GDPt is the quarterly GDP 
growth rate at time t. ROAit, is return of assets of bank i at time t. Marketsharei,t is the market share in the 
loans market of bank i at time t. Equityratioi,t is defined as the amount of equity over total assets for bank i 
at time t.  m1 and m2 show t-values of the Arrelano-Bond test for first- and second order autocorrelation. We 
report p-values of the Wald-test, which tests for joint significance of the estimated coefficients. The Hansen 
test tests if the model is overidentified. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Figure 9 
Note: The insample values are based on the full sample of the variable as provided in Appendix 2. 
Predicted values are based on estimations from regression (4) in Table 5. 
Figure 9 plots the predicted values for 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 for given levels of 𝐻𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡. The left y-axis 
represents the short run effect, while the right y-axis represents the long run effect. These 
findings also support the competition-fragility view that competition hurts financial stability. 
On average, stronger competitive behavior increases non-performing loan rates for all banks in 
the market.  
We should use caution when interpreting the validity of these findings. The H-statistic has 
shown to be an unreliable measure of competition, since ability to pass through cost changes to 
revenue could be affected by other factors, such as strategic pricing or differentiation. 
Therefore, the findings more accurately reflect the relationship between banks’ ability to pass 
through cost changes to the market and non-performing loan rates. Although the H-statistic is 
an unreliable absolute measure of competition, we are mainly interested the effect of 
competitive changes on loan risk. If the variation in the H-statistic over time represents valid 
changes in the competitive environment, the findings are valid for describing market 
mechanisms.  
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has summarized important findings in the literature on the relationship between 
competition in banking markets and financial stability, and aimed to provide an empirical 
analysis of this topic for the Norwegian banking market. Through econometric analysis, we 
find that our competition variables have a significant impact on the banks’ rate of non-
performing loans. This suggests that theories found in the literature can help explain how 
Norwegian banks react to competition.  
We find a non-linear relationship between market concentration and banks’ rates of non-
performing loans. For low levels of concentration in the banking market, increased 
concentration contributes to reduce non-performing loan rates. Past a certain level of 
concentration, this relationship is reversed. Our findings therefore imply that in order to 
minimize non-performing loan rates, there is an optimal level of market concentration. 
Regression results using both HHI and C5 indexes conclude that the Norwegian banking market 
today is close to this optimal level. Our findings suggest a continued increasing trend in 
concentration will contribute to higher non-performing loan rates. 
Using the interest rate margin as a competitive measure, we find a linear negative relationship 
between the interest rate margin and our risk measure. Higher interest rate margins are found 
to reduce the rates of non-performing loans over our sample period. Provided that the interest 
rate margin measures competitive behavior, these results imply that competition increases the 
riskiness of the banks’ loan portfolios.  
A linear positive relationship is found between the H-statistic and non-performing loan rates. 
The H-statistic is most commonly employed to distinguish between levels of competition, rather 
than being interpreted on a continuous scale. Our findings indicate that behavior in line with 
perfect competition in the long run increases the rate of non-performing loans with 1,5 
percentage points, compared to the case of monopoly.   
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Although the H-statistic is a commonly applied measure of competition in empirical banking 
studies, it is controversial due to its reliance on a series of strict assumptions. It has also been 
shown to be unreliable in several theoretical settings (Spierdijk & Shaffer, 2015). 
Both the interest rate margin and the H-statistic provide results that are in line with the franchise 
value hypothesis. First proposed in a seminal study by Keeley (1990), this theory emphasizes 
that stronger competition put banks’ margins under pressure, reducing the alternative cost of 
going bankrupt. This creates incentives for the banks to increase the risk of their investments.  
The non-linear relationship found when using concentration as a competitive measure supports 
another theoretical model, proposed by Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010). Their argument is 
that market power increases incentives for banks to avoid bankruptcy, but also reduces the 
incentives and ability of borrowers to repay their loans.  
To summarize, our findings provide support for the existence of a negative relationship between 
competition in the banking market and the riskiness of the banks’ loan portfolios. This may 
imply that banks do in fact take more risk when their market power is reduced. Our findings 
also indicate that to the extent that concentration is an appropriate measure of competition, this 
relationship is reversed when the market becomes highly concentrated.  
In this thesis, we have focused on the effect of competition on the rate of non-performing loans. 
It is important to keep in mind that the total risk for the bank may react differently. For instance, 
reducing risk from other activities could offset increased loan portfolio risk. Also, if 
competition does in fact increase the ratio of defaulting loans, this does not necessarily 
outweigh the welfare gains produced by competition. 
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Appendix 1: Calculation of the H-statistic 
8.1.1 Estimator 
According to Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2012), the preferred estimator for consistent H-
statistic calculation is the within-group estimator. Pooled OLS is found to yield the same results, 
though it is less efficient. After attempting several different specifications and estimators, we 
conclude that pooled OLS is the only estimator yielding non-erratic results for our data set. The 
within-group estimator calculates values far outside the theoretical range of the H-statistic. We 
therefore apply the pooled OLS estimator with robust standard errors in our calculations. 
8.1.2 Estimation method 
Figure 10 displays the estimates from 3 different estimation methods: static, recursive and 
rolling window estimate.  
 
Figure 10 
The figure shows that static estimation of the H-statistic yields quite volatile results, This is in 
line with the statement by Bikker and Spierdijk (2008) that static estimation yield erratic results. 
The recursive estimates lie between the theoretical values, but provide little variation in the 
competitive measure. Since this estimation method uses all previous time periods to calculate 
SNF Working Paper No 11/15
52
todays’ competition, recent information weighs relatively less. The rolling window estimation 
is mostly within the theoretical values, and provides enough variation in the competitive 
measure. Including an additional time period to the rolling window estimate reduces the error 
of the estimate but also omits one time period of observations for the analysis. A parsimonious 
rolling window of 8 quarters gives consistent estimates. Our H-statistic estimate is therefore 
calculated using a window estimate starting in period 8. 
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics table 
Table 6: Summary statistics for the entire sample of each variable 
 Mean Observations Median Min Max St. dev 
NPLrate 2.259 13033 1.52 0.000064 25.5 2.421 
       
C5 59.80 15732 60.16 54.5 66.1 2.632 
       
HHI 0.115 15732 0.11 0.082 0.17 0.024 
       
GDPgrowth 0.733 15732 0.60 -2.28 4.23 0.987 
       
Marketshare 0.689 13251 0.09 0.00025 38.4 2.740 
       
ROA 0.304 13251 0.30 -2.00 2.11 0.296 
       
Equityratio 10.33 13251 9.83 -45.4 64.3 4.344 
       
NIBOR 4.736 13349 4.46 1.48 15.8 2.601 
       
IRmargin 2.968 13315 2.64 -24.6 30.7 2.368 
       
H-statistic 0.239 14535 0.18 -1.23 1.79 0.654 
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The relationship between bank competition and financial stability has been thoroughly 
debated over the last decades. The importance of a stable banking system for financial 
stability makes this a topic of interest for both economists and regulators. 
Using accounting data for Norwegian banks over the last 20 years, we assess the 
relationship between the rate of non-performing loans and different measures of 
competition. We find a non-linear relationship between market concentration and loan 
risk. For low levels of concentration, increased concentration reduces non-performing 
loan rates. Past a certain level of concentration, this relationship is reversed. Our 
findings indicate that the Norwegian banking market today is close to this optimal level, 
suggesting that a continued increasing trend in concentration will contribute to higher 
non-performing loan rates.
Using the interest rate margin and the H-statistic as competitive measures, we find a 
linear positive relationship between competition and non-performing loan rates. 
Provided that these measures capture competitive behavior, this implies that 
competition increases loan risk.
Our findings are consistent with relevant theoretical models and earlier empirical 
research, and underline how results depend on the choice of competition measure.
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